Social identity threat can take many different forms and produce rather different behavioral responses (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) . Threat can come from an outgroup as a result of an unfavorable intergroup comparison or it can come from the ingroup in the form of an unfavorable intragroup comparison. Our research considers the interactive consequences of threat stemming from simultaneously salient intergroup and intragroup evaluative comparisons.
INTERGROUP COMPARISONS
A number of studies have revealed that threats to the status of an ingroup-as a result of poor performance or low task competence-often lead members of low-status groups to distance themselves from their ingroup (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) . Such distancing from the ingroup has been primarily observed in groups where the status difference is perceived as legitimate (Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997 ; C. E. Seta & Seta, 1992 ; J. J. Seta & Seta, 1996; Worchel, Iuzzini, Coutant, & Ivaldi, 2000) . When, however, the ingroup's low status is seen as illegitimate, or is not clearly based on task performance, members of lower status groups are less likely to display social mobility responses. Instead of distancing the self from the ingroup, they opt for more group-level responses and challenge the ingroup's comparative standing (Lee & Ottati, 1995; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & Smith, 1984 ).
An important difference between studies that have found distancing from the group following threat and those that have observed increased willingness to stick with the group is the perceived legitimacy of the intergroup distinction. When the groups are defined in terms of their performance in a particular domain, the relative achievement of the groups is seen as a valid indicator of their status. Sports teams, for example, accept their relative rankings based on number of games won during the season, with outstanding individual players likely to be tempted to move from weak teams to stronger ones. Similarly, in laboratory groups, where the relative performance rankings on a task are provided directly by the experimenter, social mobility is the most frequent response to low group status, particularly among individuals who personally perform well at the task (Ellemers, 1993 ; J. J. Seta & Seta, 1996) .
When, however, the differential group status is not clearly based on a specific performance criterion but is perceived to be based on an unjustified affective evaluation of the ingroup by an outgroup, it is likely to be perceived as illegitimate. According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) , when a group perceives an outgroup as illegitimately devaluing the ingroup, increased identification with that ingroup and groupbased responses are especially likely. Differences in the perceived legitimacy of intergroup evaluations do predict the degree to which outgroup hostility is expressed by devalued groups. Jackman (1994) , for example, has shown that American women who perceive discrimination against them as due to legitimate group differences in particular abilities (i.e., because women have less physical strength than men) are less likely to be hostile toward the outgroup than those who perceive such exclusion as illegitimate. Black Americans, in contrast to women, are less likely to perceive the discrimination they experience as due to legitimate differences in ability. Instead, they are more likely to see discrimination by Whites as illegitimate devaluation of their group (Jackman, 1994 ; see also Sigelman & Welch, 1991) . Such devaluation of the ingroup by an outgroup has been linked with greater group consciousness and collective responses to intergroup threat in a variety of devalued social groups (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002) .
Negative intergroup evaluations that are perceived as illegitimate are especially likely to evoke hostility toward the outgroup. Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) found that the more illegitimate devaluation that African Americans perceived, the more hostility they felt toward White Americans and the more they identified with their racial group. Likewise, among people with body piercings, expectations of devaluation on the part of the cultural mainstream significantly increased identification with this minority subculture and encouraged differentiation of the ingroup from the outgroup (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001) .
Thus, there is evidence that both commitment to the ingroup and derogation of the outgroup are highest among devalued groups who see themselves as unjustly maligned by a more prestigious outgroup. These findings are consistent with Tajfel's (1975 Tajfel's ( , 1978 theoretical arguments concerning the conditions under which intergroup confrontation is most likely to occur. When a group is the recipient of prejudice from another social group that is perceived to be unjust, then behavioral responses that are aimed at improving the ingroup's status can be expected.
INTRAGROUP COMPARISONS EFFECTS
A number of investigators have suggested that intragroup factors also influence group behavior. Specifically, perceived respect, resulting from a favorable intragroup evaluation, is an important predictor of group commitment and adherence to ingroup norms (Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Hogg, 1992; Jackson & Saltzstein, 1958; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996) . According to Tyler's group-value model and the correlational data supporting it, positive treatment by ingroup authorities predicts ingroup-serving behavior. We consider whether a positive intragroup evaluation from ingroup peers, rather than authorities, uniformly leads to group-serving actions. By simultaneously varying both the nature of the intragroup comparison (respect vs. disrespect) and the nature of the intergroup comparison (devalued vs. prestigious group membership), we can test the extent to which intragroup respect leads to group-serving actions in low-versus high-status groups.
J. J. Seta and Seta (1996) examined the interactive consequences of intragroup and intergroup comparisons when both are based strictly on task performance. They found that positive intragroup comparisons encourage distancing rather than group-serving behavior in low-status groups. When, however, the intergroup status differential is based on illegitimate devaluation by an outgroup, rather different group behavior patterns may be expected. Intragroup and intergroup judgments that do not reflect consensually accepted performance criteria, but instead represent dislike of either one's personal self or one's social category, should be perceived as relatively unjust. Such illegitimate evaluations convey different meanings and will have rather different consequences for group behavior than task-based com-parisons that are accepted as legitimate. As J. J. Seta and Seta (1996) note, positive intragroup performance comparisons signal recipients that they will be accepted in the better performing outgroup, which makes it feasible for them to consider defecting to the higher status group. Being liked by one's ingroup does not, however, guarantee that one will be similarly valued by an outgroupespecially when that outgroup is known to devalue one's ingroup. Members of devalued groups who receive positive intragroup evaluations may have little to gain, and much to lose, by attempting to shift group memberships.
Indeed, one characteristic feature of social devaluation is the inability to change group memberships; the group boundaries between such groups are relatively impermeable. Thus, directly challenging the outgroup's devaluation of the ingroup may be their best option for status improvement. For these reasons, socially devalued group members may be particularly group-serving when they feel valued by their ingroup.
OVERVIEW
Our most important objective was to simultaneously manipulate whether the individual is respected or disrespected by other ingroup members and whether the ingroup is accorded prestige or is devalued by the outgroup. With this design, we can assess the interactive effects of these two types of comparisons on groupserving behavior.
Based on previous social identity theory research where group-based responses have been observed when the value of the group is threatened (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Jetten et al., 2001; Turner et al., 1984) , we expected that members of socially devalued groups would be more group-serving compared to members of a prestigious group. In addition, we hypothesized that this would be especially the case when the intragroup comparison was positive. Given that their group has been devalued by the more prestigious group, they should be particularly motivated to withhold rewards from the outgroup. In addition, when devalued group members believe they are highly valued by their ingroup, they should be most likely to exhibit group-benefiting behavior when they have the option to work to improve the group's image or their own personal image. In contrast, for those who are disrespected by their devalued group, the ingroup neither yields a favorable intragroup nor a positive intergroup comparison. Because they have no particular reason to invest in the group, they are not expected to show group-serving behavior.
When the ingroup is prestigious, group members are likely to shift their concern to their personal standing. As a result, disrespected group members will only contribute to the group to the extent that this can be used to improve their own personal image (and hence secure their standing as members of a desirable group). To the extent that their actions remain private (i.e., other ingroup members will be unaware of their actions), disrespected members of a prestigious group may be disinclined to favor the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup (see Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995) . Finally, respected members of a highly prestigious group are not expected to show strong ingroup favoritism or outgroup derogation. In this situation, neither their personal image nor their group's image are threatened, so these group members should be relatively unmotivated to invest effort for either purpose (see Ouwerkerk, de Gilder, & de Vries, 2000) .
To summarize, in our experiment, we manipulate and assess the impact of intragroup and intergroup evaluative comparisons on two forms of group behavior: working to benefit the self or the ingroup and allocation of rewards to the ingroup and outgroup. We expected that intragroup and intergroup evaluations would interactively affect such behavioral responses. Specific combinations of the two types of comparisons should elicit quite different social motives: either those that are more group-serving (high respect, low prestige), those that are oriented toward improving one's personal image (low respect, high prestige), or those with relatively little motivation either because it seems unnecessary (high respect, high prestige) or because there is little to gain (low respect, low prestige). To test our prediction that working on a group activity can be engaged in for different purposes (i.e., to improve the group's image or to benefit one's personal image), we provide participants with different reasons for participating in a voluntary group activity and measure how much time they are willing to donate for each purpose.
METHOD

Participants
Undergraduates (64 women, 86 men) were randomly assigned to experimental conditions in proportion according to their gender. Their mean age was 21.6 years, with a range of 18 to 28 years. None of the participants were psychology majors and all received 20 Dutch guilders (U.S.$10) in exchange for their participation in the study.
Design
The design constituted a 2 (intragroup comparison: respected vs. disrespected) × 2 (intergroup comparison: devalued vs. prestigious group) between-subjects factorial design. The intragroup comparison was manipulated by providing participants with false feedback concerning the degree to which their fellow ingroup members allegedly liked and valued them or did not. Participants were provided with false feedback about whether their group as a whole was favorably or unfavorably evaluated by the outgroup as a means of manipulating the intergroup comparison.
Procedure
At the start of each experimental session, approximately 9 individuals were seated at computer terminals with screens that prevented them from viewing each other. The experimenters explained that instructions would be delivered during the experiment via their com-puter monitors and that they should answer the questions as presented on the screen.
Categorization into groups.
The first task that participants engaged in was an association task. The purpose of this task was described as allowing us to understand more about people who differ in their characteristic style of thinking (for other research that has used this method of categorization, see Doosje et al., 1995) . Participants were led to believe that, on the basis of their responses to this free-association task, we could classify them into one of two groups: "inductive thinkers" or "deductive thinkers." All participants received the identical feedback about their "thinking style" group membership: They, together with 4 of the other persons in the session, were members of the group inductive thinkers and the remaining 4 persons were members of the other group, deductive thinkers.
To increase the meaningfulness of the group membership that had been created, participants were led to believe that they were actually interacting with other ingroup members, whereas outgroup members seemingly worked together as a group at their computers on the same tasks. For example, in one of those tasks, participants ostensibly selected the best option for solving a series of personnel problems for which there was no correct answer (see also Doosje et al., 1995) . Participation in these group activities served ultimately as the means by which one group could provide an evaluation of the character of the other group.
After completing the intergroup activities, each individual was asked to describe one favorable and one unfavorable behavioral act that they had personally committed within the last month. Participants were informed that this information was being solicited from them so that it might be shared with the other ingroup members and that it would serve as a basis for them to get to know each other's character better. It was intended to make the false feedback that they would later receive believable by providing an ostensible basis for having other ingroup members evaluate them. Subsequently, participants were asked to judge the 4 ingroup members' and the 4 outgroup members' character on the basis of the behavioral episodes that each had seemingly provided. In reality, however, all of the information received about the members of both groups was preprogrammed. In a prior pilot study, the behavioral episodes were rated in terms of their favorableness. Eight positive items that had been rated similarly (e.g., helped decorate my friend's apartment) were randomly assigned to the 4 ingroup and 4 outgroup members. Likewise, eight negative items (e.g., forgot the birthday of a good friend) that were equivalent were randomly assigned to the 4 ingroup and 4 outgroup members.
Manipulation of group prestige. We manipulated the prestige of the ingroup with a false feedback procedure. In the devalued group condition, participants were told that on a 9-point scale, the other group had assigned their group a score of 3.6. It was stated that their group's score was below the neutral point of 5.0, and because it was on the negative end of the scale, their group was clearly not liked by the other group. In the prestigious group condition, by contrast, participants were told that their group was judged positively by the other group, receiving a score of 6.4. Because the score was above the neutral point of 5.0, their group was clearly liked by the other group. Participants were asked to write down their group's score and to indicate which group was evaluated better than the other.
Manipulation of personal respect. The respect manipulation involved providing participants with false feedback about the judgments their fellow ingroup members had made about them. In the disrespect condition, participants were told that their score of 4.5 on a 9-point scale was both below the midpoint of the scale (5.0) and, in addition, was distinctly less positive than the judgments made about other ingroup members (M = 5.7). It was emphasized that they personally fell well below the mean in terms of how well they were liked by the other members of their group. In the respect condition, participants were told that their score of 6.9 was above the scale midpoint of 5.0 and that they were liked more by other ingroup members than were other group members (M = 5.7). Participants were requested to write down how they had been evaluated by other ingroup members in terms of the actual score received and their position within the group.
Dependent Variables
Manipulation checks. All participants correctly indicated by writing down the feedback that they had been given that they understood both the intragroup and intergroup feedback. To assess, however, whether we had successfully manipulated the psychological constructs of interest, type of threat, less obvious manipulation check measures were collected. First, the intragroup manipulation was expected to influence how worthy the respondent felt as a member of this specific ingroup. Consequently, the four-item Membership subscale (e.g., "I am a worthy member of the inductive thinker group that I belong to") of Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) collective self-esteem scale was completed. Second, to assess whether the group prestige manipulation had affected perceptions of how others value their ingroup, the fouritem Public collective self-esteem subscale (e.g., "Overall, my group, the inductive thinkers, is considered good by others") was administered. These measures allow us to determine whether the two forms of group-level esteem were independently varied as a function of the intragroup respect and intergroup prestige manipulations. All of the items from the two subscales were rated on 1 to 9 scales, with higher numbers reflecting more of each type of collective self-esteem.
To ensure that our manipulations of intragroup and intergroup evaluative comparisons did not differentially influence personal self-esteem, participants were asked to complete the Rosenberg (1965) measure (e.g., At times I think I am no good at all). All 10 items were responded to on a 1 to 9 scale, where higher numbers indicate more positive personal self-esteem.
Perceived justice of the evaluation. We measured two distinct forms of perceived justice concerning the evaluations received. Judgments assessing the treatment they had received from their ingroup and those stemming from the treatment that their ingroup had received from the outgroup were collected. To assess perceived intragroup justice, participants indicated whether they believed the judgment made about them by other ingroup members was just (1 = not at all just, 9 = very just) and the extent to which they were satisfied with the judgment made about them by their ingroup (1 = not at all satisfied, 9 = very satisfied). Similarly, perceived justice and satisfaction with the judgment made by the outgroup about their ingroup were assessed on 9-point scales, where higher numbers indicate greater satisfaction and more perceived justice.
Group behavioral responses. Two rather different types of group behavior measures were collected. First, the number of reward points, which was introduced as comparable to monetary payment, that participants wanted to allocate to the ingroup and the outgroup were assessed. Participants were asked to indicate sequentially how much of a total of 100 possible points they would give as a reward to their ingroup and how much of the 100 points they would award to the outgroup. As is typically done in minimal categorization studies using this indicator of intergroup discrimination, we made it clear to participants that the rewards that they assigned to the two groups could not affect their own personal outcomes (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) . Second, to distinguish between different possible underlying reasons for investing time in a group activity, participants were asked the amount of extra time they would be willing to donate for a subsequent and voluntary group task. Before doing so, we informed participants via their computers that "although the study is now complete, there will be an opportunity to participate in an additional group activity on a voluntary basis." It was explained on screen that there were two distinct purposes for which their donated time could serve, if they were willing to stay for this separate group task that would begin shortly. Participants then were asked to indicate how much time they were willing to spend on each activity by typing in the number of minutes they would donate for the group activity when it could be used to improve their personal image with other ingroup members and the time they would donate for the group activity when it could be used to improve the image of the ingroup with outgroup members. The time investment measure therefore assessed the number of minutes (0 or greater) beyond the end of the experiment that participants were willing to donate to a new group activity for each of these purposes. Once they had completed the two time measures on the computer, a new screen told participants to signal the experimenters. After probing participants for suspicion, it was explained that there would not be any further tasks after all. The true purposes of the study were explained and payment for participation was provided.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Membership collective self-esteem. The four-item Membership collective self-esteem subscale (α = .74) formed a reliable index of the extent to which participants perceived themselves as good ingroup members. Mean scores were subjected to a 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) analysis of variance. The main effect of intragroup respect was significant, F(1, 146) = 12.21, p < .001. Participants who were disrespected by their fellow ingroup members felt that they were less worthy group members (M = 6.01, SD = 1.23) than did participants who were accorded respect by their ingroup (M = 6.72, SD = 1.22). The main effect of intergroup prestige and the interaction were not significant; therefore, we can conclude that we successfully manipulated perceived threat to one's value as an ingroup member.
Public collective self-esteem. The four-item Public collective self-esteem subscale formed a reliable index (α = .75) of how participants believed others evaluate their ingroup. Mean scores were subjected to a 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) analysis of variance. The main effect of intergroup prestige was significant, F(1, 146) = 39.05, p < .001. Participants who received feedback that the outgroup thought poorly of their ingroup reported less public collective self-esteem (M = 5.04, SD = 1.30) than those who believed the outgroup saw their group positively (M = 6.20, SD = 0.92). The main effect of intragroup respect and the interaction were not significant. Thus, perceived threat to the ingroup's standing relative to a salient outgroup was reflected in reductions in public self-esteem based on this group membership.
Personal self-esteem. The 10 items of the Rosenberg (1965) personal self-esteem measure formed a reliable index (α = .85). The mean of these items was subjected to a 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) analysis of variance. No significant effects emerged, all Fs(1, 146) < 1. Participants reported moderately positive levels of personal self-esteem (M = 7.11, SD = 1.06), regardless of condition.
Perceived Justice of the Evaluations Received
Judgments about the self. The justice and satisfaction items formed a reliable index concerning the legitimacy of the self's evaluation by the ingroup (α = .77) and was subjected to a 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) analysis of variance. Only the main effect of intragroup evaluation was significant, F(1, 146) = 175.15, p < .0001. Individuals considered the judgment about their personal self to be considerably less just (M = 3.58, SD = 1.35) in the disrespect condition compared to the respect condition (M = 6.28, SD = 1.11).
Judgments about the ingroup. The extent to which participants were satisfied with and perceived the judgment made about their ingroup by the outgroup as just formed a reliable measure of the legitimacy of the ingroup's evaluation (α = .80). This index was subjected to a 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) analysis of variance. Only the intergroup evaluation main effect was significant, F(1, 146) = 144.18, p < .0001. Those in the devalued group saw the outgroup's evaluation of their group as substantially less just (M = 3.50, SD = 1.33) than those in the prestigious group (M = 5.87, SD = 1.07).
A similar degree of perceived injustice stemming from the two types of evaluations that had been made salient-intragroup and intergroup-was obtained. When the devaluation stemmed from other ingroup members, it resulted in lowered perceived personal justice, but when devaluation stemmed from the outgroup, it resulted in lowered perceived group justice. In contrast to the performance feedback used in previous research, both the intragroup and intergroup evaluative feedback were clearly perceived by our participants as illegitimate.
Group Behavioral Responses
Reward allocations. The number of points allocated to the ingroup and the outgroup were measured separately, with each potentially varying on a 0-and 100-point scale. A 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) analysis of variance was performed on each measure to assess whether the manipulations more strongly affected ingroup favoritism or outgroup derogation. Only the main effect of intragroup evaluation was significant for the ingroup allocation measure, F(1, 146) = 3.86, p < .05, with those in the respect condition allocating more points to the ingroup (M = 69.57, SD = 13.81) compared to those in the disrespect condition (M = 64.99, SD = 15.08). Ingroup favoritism, then, was simply a function of how much the participants perceived their ingroup as valuing them.
For the outgroup allocation measure, the intergroup evaluation main effect was significant, F(1, 146) = 6.85, p < .01, with devalued group members withholding rewards from the outgroup more than prestigious group members. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant two-way interaction between the intragroup and intergroup evaluations, F(1, 146) = 4.62, p < .04. Analysis of the simple main effects for the means shown in Figure 1 reveals that, as expected, the fewest rewards were allocated to outgroup members when participants were respected by their ingroup and the ingroup was devalued by the outgroup (M = 51.32, SD = 21.18). In contrast, significantly greater rewards were allocated to the outgroup either when participants were respected by a prestigious ingroup (M = 64.03, SD = 11.94), F(1, 146) = 11.21, p < .001, or when devalued group members were disrespected by their ingroup (M = 59.59, SD = 19.16), F(1, 146) = 4.66, p < .04. Thus, respected members of a devalued group appear to be particularly prone to withholding rewards from the outgroup. Members of a prestigious group, in contrast, appear to be more evenhanded in their treatment of the two groups, regardless of the degree of respect accorded the individual. The lowered ingroup favoritism found here is consistent with prior research on intergroup behavior when threat to the ingroup's status position is absent. When, however, threat to a prestigious group's position is present, considerably less even-handed intergroup allocations can be expected (see Branscombe, Ellemers, et al., 1999) .
Time donated to work on a group activity. The time participants were willing to donate to work on a subsequent group activity beyond the end of the experiment was divided by participants according to the purpose their time might serve. The two types of time donation (either to improve the image of the personal self or to improve the image of the ingroup) were subjected to a 2 (intragroup evaluation: disrespected or respected) × 2 (intergroup evaluation: devalued or prestigious) × 2 (purpose served) analysis of variance, with repeated measures on the latter factor. A significant two-way interaction between the intragroup and intergroup evaluation factors was obtained, F(1, 146) = 7.14, p < .01, but it was qualified by a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 146) = 3.99, p < .05. The means for the two types of time donations are shown by condition in Figure 2 .
Examining first the time participants volunteered to improve their personal image, the two-way interaction between intragroup and intergroup evaluation was significant, F(1, 146) = 3.81, p < .05. Intragroup respect did not differentially affect the time invested to improve the self's personal image when the group was devalued, F(1, 146) < 1. However, when the ingroup was prestigious, participants were more prepared to invest time to improve their personal image when they were disrespected (M = 13.35, SD = 21.13) compared to when they were respected (M = 7.41, SD = 6.09), F(1, 146) = 2.91, p < .05. The intergroup evaluation factor did not reliably affect the amount of time donated to improve their personal image within either the disrespected or respected conditions, Fs < 1. Thus, people are most willing to invest time in a group activity to improve their personal image when they are currently evaluated unfavorably by their fellow ingroup members but the group itself is high in prestige.
In terms of the amount of time invested to improve the ingroup's image, the two-way interaction between intragroup and intergroup evaluation was also significant, F(1, 146) = 8.74, p < .005. In this case, when the group was devalued, those who were respected were significantly more willing to work to improve the ingroup's image (M = 19.41, SD = 27.27) compared to devalued group members who were disrespected by their ingroup (M = 5.90, SD = 5.79), F(1, 146) = 10.29, p < .01. Indeed, the amount of time invested by respected members of a devalued group (M = 19.41, SD = 27.27) was significantly greater than for respected members of a prestigious group (M = 8.46, SD = 6.56), F(1, 146) = 6.64, p < .01. The intragroup evaluation factor did not significantly affect time investment for ingroup image improvement in the high group prestige condition, F < 1, and intergroup prestige did not affect the responses of those who were disrespected, F < 1.
The amount of time donated to improve the image of the ingroup among respected members of a devalued group (M = 19.41, SD = 27.27) was significantly greater than the amount of time they donated to improve the image of the personal self (M = 12.49, SD = 19.73), F(1, 146) = 8.64, p < .004, but this difference in time allocation by type of purpose was not reliably different in any of the other conditions. Thus, people were consistently more willing to allocate their time to improve the ingroup's image, even beyond that donated to improve their personal image, when they were respected by their fellow devalued group members.
DISCUSSION
Two distinct forms of threat and perceived injustice were created, depending on whether the self or the ingroup was the recipient of a negative evaluative comparison. When the self was not respected by other ingroup members, perceptions of worth as a group member were harmed and perceived personal injustice was increased. When the ingroup was devalued by an outgroup, esteem based on the ingroup's reputation was hurt and group-based injustice was elevated. Our aim was to create both illegitimate personal and group devaluation, and we clearly succeeded in doing so.
As predicted, the two types of evaluative comparisons interactively affected reward allocations, as well as the time participants were willing to invest in a group activity to achieve different goals. How people respond to unjust devaluation on the part of an outgroup depends on how valued they feel by their ingroup. Respected members of a devalued group were by far the most inclined to withhold rewards from the outgroup, and they donated the greatest amount of time to improving their ingroup's image. Such evidence of outgroup derogation among respected members of a devalued group suggests that their behavior is not simply based on personal selfinterest but instead reflects group-based competition aimed at improving the relative standing of the ingroup versus the outgroup. Although we claim that respected members of a devalued group may be especially group-benefiting, based on their differential time allocations for improving the ingroup's image rather than the personal self's, we are not in a position to rule out all self-interested possibilities. For people who are devalued because of their group membership, improving the status of a group that does value them might well be consistent with self-interest motivation. However, respected members of a devalued group did not show stronger ingroup favoritism than did respected members of a prestigious group, which would have been most supportive of a self-interest interpretation of the results. Rather, respected members of the devalued group were most likely to withhold rewards from the outgroup, which suggests that they are willing to challenge directly the legitimacy of the existing intergroup relation.
Unlike prior research that operationalized intragroup value in terms of being more competent at a group-defining task relative to other ingroup members, in our work, the intragroup evaluation was based on other ingroup members respecting and valuing the individual. Favorable intragroup comparisons based on task performance or ability are most likely to entice devalued group members to move toward the better performing group because such social mobility is seen as possible (Ellemers et al., 1990; C. E. Seta & Seta, 1992 ; J. J. Seta & Seta, 1996; Worchel et al., 2000) . However, ability and liking are often not correlated dimensions in person perception (see Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Slater, 1955) and the two exert different effects on group behavior. Of importance, respect from other ingroup members, in contrast to task ability, may not be easily transferred from one group membership to another. Members of socially devalued groups cannot assume that they will be respected by the higher status outgroup, particularly when the more prestigious group is the source of the ingroup's devaluation.
In contrast to devalued group members, disrespected members of the prestigious group did not discriminate against the outgroup; in fact, they did not differentiate between the two groups in their reward allocations. When the group was prestigious, disrespected members were willing to invest in further group activities only when their time could be used as a vehicle for improving their personal image. As prior research has demonstrated (Noel et al., 1995) , people show strategic intergroup behavior as a means of securing a more favorable position within a group they see as desirable. Those who are disrespected seem to be only willing to exert themselves by engaging in a group activity if the group is worth remaining in because of its prestige.
Consistent with Tajfel's (1982) argument that people can display superficially similar forms of group behavior to achieve different underlying goals, we found marked differences in willingness to engage in the same group activity when different purposes might be served by doing so. By allowing people to choose the purpose for which their group participation might be used, we found that those who feel highly valued by an ingroup that they perceive to be unjustly maligned were willing to do so seemingly out of genuine concern for the group's welfare. Those who do not feel valued by their ingroup likewise engaged in group activities when the group was prestigious, but only to the extent that doing so could be used to improve their personal status. Had we measured only willingness to donate time to a group activity, this important difference in purpose served would have been overlooked.
The present research demonstrates that the effects of intragroup respect depend on the group's status position. When confronted with membership in a devalued group, only those members who feel highly respected by their ingroup are inclined to engage in activities that could improve their group's image. This finding modifies the conclusions drawn from prior correlational research (Tyler et al., 1996) on perceived respect and prestige, which suggested that respect might be most important in motivating adherence to group norms in groups perceived to be prestigious. Because we experimentally varied the experience of both ingroup and outgroup devaluation, whereas prior research has simply measured subjective perceptions of evaluation, we are on firmer ground in drawing conclusions about how respect and prestige can jointly influence group-serving behavior. Because people may be relatively unaware of the impact that different types of comparative evaluations will actually exert on their behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) , we think it is important to examine their actual impact.
Which of these motives and their respective underlying comparisons-intragroup versus intergroup-will be most salient at any given moment in time might well vary with the social context, resulting in different consequences for group behavior. In our study, both types of comparisons were simultaneously made salient and, as indicated by the manipulation checks, our participants were equally aware of both types of feedback. Indeed, future research assessing the impact of these two forms of evaluative comparisons on actual intragroup and intergroup interactions would be valuable. Based on our results, highly respected members of devalued groups might well be measurably more hostile than respected members of prestigious groups when negotiating with outgroup members. This would be consistent with their willingness to withhold rewards from the outgroup that we observed. In addition, respected members of devalued groups might be expected to persist over the long haul in making the ingroup's interests a priority and to explicitly encourage other ingroup members to do the same.
In comparing our perspective on intragroup respect to that put forth by the group value model (Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Smith, 1999) , several differences should be noted. First, we have shown that respect can stem from actual ingroup evaluation outcomes and need not be inferred from the procedures used when an outcome is delivered. Second, according to the group value model, respect is inferred as a result of the procedures used by group authorities such as judges, elected officials, and organizational managers. However, respect may be derived from all sorts of ingroup members, not just those with structural power. In fact, under some circumstances, respect from an authority (e.g., one's boss in a factory) might be less group-motivating than would be the receipt of respect from fellow ingroup members at the same level (e.g., coworkers). Based on a selfcategorization theory analysis (Haslam, 2001) , it might be predicted that some authorities (e.g., management) would be perceived as outgroup members rather than as ingroup members (e.g., among labor union workers). Research examining when authorities are likely to be seen as ingroup members (and valued sources of respect) or when they will be seen as outgroup members (making respect from them potentially threatening) would be a useful extension of our work.
To conclude, intragroup and intergroup evaluative comparisons have an interactive impact on group behavior. Those who receive little respect from other ingroup members are only willing to stick with the group if the group is worth it (i.e., when it is highly prestigious) and when they might be able to improve their personal standing by doing so. Such individuals appear to be relatively concerned with what the group can do for them. However, when the ingroup's image is threatened by unjust devaluation on the part of an outgroup, respect from other ingroup members may motivate a concern for the ingroup itself and lead such persons to challenge the existing intergroup status quo. Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Mahatma Gandhi were all internationally recognized representatives of socially devalued groups who were committed to improving the position of their group, even at great personal cost. We suggest that the respect they received from their ingroup may have been crucial to their willingness to consider what they could do for their group.
